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China’s economy has expanded in leaps and bounds to become 
a major world trade player. For Latin America, China’s growth is both a 
threat and an opportunity. With a few exceptions, Latin American trade 
clearly benefits from this country’s global integration. In order to analyse 
China’s trade impact, we study the country’s export and import structures. 
A database of 620 different goods and two indices of trade competition 
were used to compare the impact of China on 34 economies (including 15 
Latin American countries) during the period 1998-2004. In general terms, 
the results confirm that there is no relevant trade competition between 
China and Latin America in the United States market. Not surprisingly, 
those countries that export mainly commodities face less competition. 
This is to be expected, since China is a net importer of raw materials and 
Latin America has a strong commodity endowment.
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Over the past two decades, China has become a major 
player in the global economy. In less than 20 years, 
its GDP has grown at an impressive rate of nearly 
9.5% according to official figures,1 and its share of 
world trade has jumped from a meagre 1% to more 
than 6%. 
China’s integration into the world economy has 
been one of the major events of recent decades. In 
2003, it was already the sixth-largest economy in the 
world, measured at the market exchange rate,2 the 
fourth-largest global trader and the biggest recipient 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world. If its 
trade growth continues, China will soon emerge as the 
third-largest trading economy in the world, overtaking 
Japan for the first time and coming in just behind the 
United States and Germany. In 2005, China overtook 
the United Kingdom to become the fourth-largest 
economy in the world.
As underlined by almost all Wall Street analysts, 
China’s emergence has become the issue of the decade. 
The figures cited in discussing the country’s 1.3 billion 
consumers are inevitably on a colossal scale. Goldman 
Sachs predicts that, by 2040, China will overtake the 
United States as the world’s biggest economy.3 Much of 
the analysis might be overly optimistic, inviting some 
analysts to wonder if China’s growth surge is being 
driven by an investment bubble, while others sound 
the alarm about a possible hard landing or worry about 
the Chinese currency peg4 and the banking system.5 
According to other analysts, China’s developing 
capitalism is not solidly based on law, a respect for 
property rights and free markets. Lastly, it is unclear 
whether Chinese public banks allocate their capital 
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1 Uncertainties about Chinese statistics abound. In 2003, for example, 
the official GDP growth rate was 9.1% but almost all economists 
following China suspected that the figure was over 11%. In 2005, 
Chinese authorities revised their statistics, upgrading GDP growth 
among other variables. On the contrary, Alwyn Young of Chicago 
University, estimated that GDP growth over the period 1978-1998 
was 1.7 percentage points below the official one (Young, 2000 and 
2003).
2 In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China is the second 
largest economy behind the United States.
I
Introduction
3 Over the past years, Goldman Sachs has implemented an aggressive 
strategy to enter China. This United States based global investment 
bank runs its business in the Asia-Pacific region with an office in 
Hong Kong as its headquarters. Goldman Sachs also has offices 
in Beijing and Shanghai for Chinese business contacts. In Asia, it 
employs over 1,000 people and 150 of them are dealing with Chinese 
businesses. For the challenges facing Goldman Sachs in China, see 
Yao, Li, and others (2003).
4 Concerns about the Chinese currency intensified during 2003 and 
2004, an electoral year in the United States (Eichengreen, 2004 
and 2006).
5 On the Chinese banking system, see Deutsche Bank (2004) and the 
Bank of Spain (2004). Over the past two decades, the rush of foreign 
banks into the Chinese financial system has also intensified, reflecting 
the deeper trade relations between China and the rest of the world. 
Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank Corporation (HSBC), Citgroup, Scotia, 
Crédit Lyonnais and BNP Paribas are among the foreign commercial 
banks with the strongest representation. Of the investment banks, the 
most active are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, 
JP Morgan, UBS and Crédit Suisse First Boston (CSFB). In 2003, 
investment banks paid out more than US$ 200 million in fees for 
initial public offerings (IPOs) of China-based companies according 
to estimates by Dealogic (a leading British information provider) 
released by the Financial Times (although this amount was not 
enough to compensate them for their expenditure).
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according to capitalist economic criteria and whether 
they are therefore vulnerable to negative shocks. What 
is evident is the Chinese “gold rush” being experienced 
in nearly all markets. This is the case, for example, 
in bond markets owing to the issuance of Chinese 
bonds. In mid-October 2004, China issued a 10-year 
1-billion euro bond that has been oversubscribed more 
than fourfold by large European investors, ranging 
from Finnish pension funds to Italian asset managers. 
The spreads of 50-60 basis points over United States 
Treasury bonds are largely comparable to those of 
Chilean investment grade paper and even to those of 
developed countries, like the 20 basis points paid by 
Spain the same week of the issuance.
In any event, the appetite of foreign investors for 
Chinese “gold mines” has grown steadily. Economic 
historians would, however, nuance China’s emergence 
and subsequent boom by suggesting that it is not totally 
new or unprecedented.6 China was already the largest 
economy for much of recorded history and, until the 
fifteenth century, China had the highest per capita 
income in the world. In 1820, although it had already 
been long overtaken by Europe in terms of per capita 
GDP, it still accounted for 30% of world GDP. As is 
also underlined by IMF and HSBC, the recent Chinese 
experience can easily be compared to that of Japan 
or the emerging Asian economies and indeed, China’s 
share of world trade is still far below that of Japan 
for example (IMF, 2004; HSBC, 2005). These studies 
emphasize that China’s rising share in world output and 
economic integration is already having a significant 
impact all around the world. This is the case in Asia 
(Ahearne, Fernald and others 2003) but also much 
further afield in Africa for instance (Goldstein, Pinaud 
and others, 2006).
The growing impact of China on Latin America 
has also raised the interest of major institutions involved 
in the region (ECLAC, 2005; Andean Development 
Corporation, 2006). Mirroring moves by the Asian 
Development Bank (Lin, 2004; Lall and Weiss, 2004), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has 
multiplied the number of studies into the impact of 
Chinese growth on Latin America7 and has developed 
a dense research network and agenda to encourage 
research between Asia and Latin America.8 At the 
IDB Annual Meeting in Lima, China’s application for 
membership was formally submitted and Japan was 
chosen as host for the 2005 Annual Meeting. On 1 
October 2004, IDB organized a major event on China 
and Latin America in Washington, in cooperation 
with the Asian Development Bank, and published an 
extensive report (IDB, 2004). As underlined by one 
panellist and then-President of IDB, Enrique Iglesias, 
it was the first time in the history of the institution that 
such an event was taking place. 
The Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), 
a major European bank with a large Latin American 
franchise, has also published several studies to assess 
the impact of China on the region. In its monthly 
review, Latinwatch, BBVA published two articles on 
this issue. The first, published in Latinwatch of June 
2003 (BBVA, 2003) and entitled “Mexico and China in 
World Trade” suggested that the emergence of China as 
a global trade player was a negative event for Mexico. 
The second (BBVA, 2004), entitled “China’s Economic 
Potential and Opportunities for Argentina”, concluded 
that the results for Argentina were the opposite of those 
for Mexico. The fact that the same review published 
two case studies with contradictory results is, to say the 
least, surprising. The perception about the impact of the 
emergence of China on Latin America seems therefore 
to be rather contradictory. On the one hand, China’s 
very low labour costs and strong competitiveness are 
a risk for other economies. On the other hand, China’s 
enormous domestic market presents an opportunity. Is 
China an angel or a demon for Latin America?
This paper assesses the trade impact of China on 
Latin America, on the basis of the emergence of China 
as a global player. It follows the same lines as the 
Rumbaugh and Blancher study (2004) which analysed 
the risks and opportunities of China’s emergence, 
but on a global scale. Unfortunately, Rumbaugh and 
Blancher (2004) exclude Latin America. Most of the 
studies on the impact of Chinese trade on emerging 
markets tend to concentrate on Asia, where Chinese 
exports tend to crowd out the exports of other Asian 
countries (see Eichengreen and others, 2004). In fact, 
much of the increase in United States imports from 
China has been at the expense not of Mexico or Central 
American countries (protected by proximity) but of 
6 See the study of Angus Maddison for the OECD Development 
Centre (Maddison, 1998) for a historical perspective on the Chinese 
economy and the papers of Carol Shiue and Wolfgang Keller (2004a 
and 2004b).
7 See for example Lora (2004a) and IDB (2006).
8 See the website of the Latin American/Caribbean and Asia Pacific 
Economics and Business Association (LAEBA): http://www.laeba.
org/index.cfm.
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Asian countries like Japan or other emerging economies 
in the area. For example, in 1988, nearly 60% of United 
States shoe imports came from South Korea or Taiwan 
Province of China, compared to a meagre 2% from 
China. By 2005, China’s share was more than 70%, 
while United States imports from South Korea and 
Taiwan Province of China had dwindled.
This emergence of China as a global trade player 
is exceptional in terms of its speed and depth. China 
is already a much more open economy than most 
emerging markets. In 2005, the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services reached more than 70% 
of GDP while the figure is 30% or less in the United 
States, Japan or Brazil (Chinese trade performance is 
however comparable to some Latin American countries 
such as Chile or Mexico with ratios of 60-65%, and 
also to some developed countries like Spain). The 
growth trend also seems sustainable over the medium 
term, driven by both external and domestic demand. 
According to Soler (2003), trade growth will be 
accompanied by a 1% yearly productivity growth in 
China between 2003 and 2012, which suggests that 
current Chinese growth is sustainable in the medium 
term. The rate of growth will probably decelerate as 
China develops, yet it will remain significant. 
This paper assesses the impact of growth and trade 
not only in the short term, but also in the medium term.
It is structured as follows: section II concentrates on the 
emergence of China as a global trade player; section III 
is about the trade structure of China; Section IV focuses 
on Chinese trade competition. Section V is centred on 
trade opportunities from strong Chinese demand and 
deals with geographical aspects and their impact on 
trade with China. Section VI examines China’s impact 
in the long term. Lastly, section VII presents the main 
conclusions.
II
The emergence of China 
as a global trade player
China’s progress since it f irst opened to foreign 
investment and reform in 1978 has been dazzling. 
Average annual GDP growth reached 9.5% during the 
period 1978-2005.9 Over the last 20 years, and after a 
long period of economic autarky, the country emerged 
as a major player in world trade. In this context, China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
December 2001 could be considered a milestone. 
During those years, China significantly reduced its 
tariffs and progressively joined global trade. Nowadays, 
its weighted average tariff is 6.4% compared with 
40.6% 10 years ago (see table 1). 
In this process of commercial opening, the Chinese 
share in the global market grew quickly. However, 
when compared to some Latin American countries, the 
growth rate of China’s exports looks less impressive in 
relative terms. During the 1990s for example, countries 
like Mexico, Chile or Costa Rica registered a more 
impressive export growth rate than China during the 
same period (Lora, 2004b). The positive performance 
of exports allowed China to gain market share in 
developed markets (see table 2). By definition, this 
gain in market share was achieved at the expense of 
other economies.
This is one of the reasons why China is perceived 
by most emerging economies as a tough trade 
competitor.10 Some countries even blame China for 
the poor performance of their exports in recent years.11 
China is indeed taking the place of other emerging 
countries in world markets. This negative perception 
9 On this performance and its sustainability, see Yifu Lin (2004); 
Zijian Wang and Wei (2004).
10 One indicator of the increasing competitive tensions generated 
by the emergence of China is the rising number of anti-dumping 
claims against China. In recent years, China has become the top 
anti-dumping target (see Chu and Prusa, 2004).
11 For example, the poor performance of the industrial sector in the 
United States, despite its significant economic growth during the 
period 2002-2004, is indirectly attributed to China. There is an “off-
shoring” process and, in this context, United States corporations are 
transferring their manufacturing activities to China to take advantage 
of its low labour costs. Similarly, some analysts claim that the poor 
performance of Mexican exports in recent years is due to China.
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increased after 2001, when China joined WTO. The 
accession to WTO opened up global markets to Chinese 
goods and it made the Chinese ability to compete 
successfully in those markets even more obvious. As a 
matter of fact, it is clear that there is strong competition 
between China and other economies that specialize in 
exporting industrial goods with relatively low value 
added. It is therefore clear that some costs will appear 
in the short-term. 
As if to confirm this perception, China’s share of 
world exports has increased rapidly over the last 20 
years. In 1980, China accounted for 0.9% of world 
exports and by 2002 its share had risen to 5%. In 
2003, it reached nearly 6% and, by the end of 2004, 
China was becoming the world’s third biggest exporter 
(after the United States and Germany). From 1990 to 
2002, world exports grew by around 90% and Chinese 
exports by about 425%. This performance of Chinese 
exports implies, by definition, that other countries are 
losing market share. It is clear that, in the short-term, 
some costs will appear. China can produce goods of 
low value added at a very low cost. The reason is that 
labour is relatively more abundant in China than in 
other economies. Wages are on average four times 
lower in China than in Latin American countries. 
In 2002, the average Chinese monthly salary in the 
manufacturing sector was 112 dollars, compared with 
around 440 dollars in Mexico and 300 dollars in other 
urban maquila countries of Central America such as 
Costa Rica, El Salvador or Panama. However, all these 
facts might be interpreted too naively in an exclusively 
negative way. 
On the positive side, we f ind that there are 
benefits to be had from trade with China. China has an 
enormous domestic market. The development of China 
will be accompanied by a flowering of its market. The 
emergence of China implies long-term trade benefits. 
Developing countries like those of East Asia, which 
have established strong trade and investment relations 
with China, could benefit from this process. 
TABLE 1
Chinese tariffs over the last twenty years
 Unweighted average Weighted average Dispersion Maximum
   (standard deviation)
1982 55.6 - - -
1992 42.9 40.6 - 220.0
1997 17.6 16.0 13.0 121.6
2002 12.3 6.4 9.1 71.0
Source: Based on World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2004).
TABLE 2
Chinese exports’ market shares in major markets 
(Percentage of total imports of major markets)
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2002 2004 2005a
Japan 0.5 1.4 3.1 5.1 14.5 18.3 20.8 21.0
United States ... ... 0.5 3.2 8.6 11.1 13.8 14.2
European Unionb 0.8 0.6 0.7 2.0 6.2 7.5 14.1 10.1
Source: Based on figures taken from IMF, World Economic Outlook and Direction of Trade Statistics
a 2005 (January-June). 
b Not including intra-trade among countries of the European Union.
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In order to analyse the short-term impact of Chinese 
trade performance, it is first necessary to study the 
country’s export and import structure.
The first relevant point is that there is an enormous 
gap between merchandise exports and imports. In fact, 
the difference between exports and imports is US$ 30.4 
billion. As mentioned in the previous section, however, 
this feature of the Chinese trade balance should be a 
temporary characteristic. In other words, we expect a 
more sustainable trade balance in the long term.
The database used in this section is that of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).12 It covers 620 different goods and uses the 
three-digit Standard International Trade Classification. 
The UNCTAD one-digit classification is used here for 
ease of presentation.
On the export side, there are three key sectors in 
2004: manufactured goods, machinery and transport 
equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured goods. 
These three sectors add up to 87.4% of total exports 
(see table 3).
We should highlight the impressive performance of 
machinery and transport equipment. In 1998, this sort 
of merchandise amounted to 28.0% of total exports. 
Six years later, it represented 46.6%, i.e. an 18.6 point 
increase. Miscellaneous manufactured goods, on the 
other hand, are rapidly losing their share.
As far as imports are concerned, we find that 
manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment 
and chemicals are the relevant sectors. These added up 
to 69.2% of total imports in 2004 (see table 4). The 
relatively similar structure of exports and imports 
suggests that significant intra-industry trade is taking 
place. In fact, this evidence reflects the fact that China 
has turned into a regional production centre and 
manufacturing point for re-exports. 
As in the previous case, machinery and transport 
equipment is increasing rapidly. Manufactured goods, 
on the other hand, are losing weight in the import 
structure. In fact, if we use the Interactive Graphic 
System for International Trade Data (SIGCI) database 
(ECLAC) we find the same results. This database divides 
the trade structure into high-technology manufactured 
goods, middle-technology manufactured goods, low-
technology manufactured goods, manufactured goods 
III
The trade structure of China
12 This database can be found on line at www.intracen.org.
TABLE 3
Export Structure of China
(% of total exports)
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Machinery and transport equipment 28.0 31.1 34.2 36.8 40.3 44.0 46.6
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 37.3 36.2 33.7 31.9 30.2 28.1 25.6
Manufactured goods 16.0 15.3 15.4 14.8 14.5 14.0 15.2
Chemical products 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.2 4.2
Food and animals 5.8 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.5 4.0 3.2
Mineral fuel and lubricants 2.8 2.3 3.1 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.4
Commodities 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6
Crude material (excl. food and fuel) 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9
Beverages and tobacco 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Animal and vegetable oil/fat/wax 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Source: Database 2004 of the International Trade Centre (ITC), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/World Trade 
Organization (UNCTAD/WTO).
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TABLE 4
Import structure of China 
(% of total imports)
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Machinery and transport equipment 38.8 40.5 40.3 42.3 45.3 45.9 44.4
Manufactured goods 22.5 21.2 19.0 17.7 17.2 16.2 13.6
Chemical products 13.8 13.8 12.7 12.4 12.3 11.1 11.2
Miscellaneous manufactured goods 7.8 7.3 6.1 7.7 7.6 8.6 9.4
Crude material (excl. food and fuel) 7.5 7.6 8.8 9.0 7.6 8.2 9.8
Mineral fuel and lubricants 4.9 5.5 9.2 7.2 6.6 7.1 8.6
Food and animals 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6
Commodities 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9
Animal and vegetable oil/fat/wax 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
Source: Based on data from Intracen 2004, UNCTAD/WTO.
TABLE 5
Export and Import Structure of China 
(% of total exports and imports)
 1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005
Export Structure
High-tech manufactured goods 5.3 13.0 22.4 30.3 32.5 33.2
Low-tech manufactured goods 40.2 46.3 41.2 35.2 32.5 31.5
Mid-tech manufactured goods 20.8 18.8 19.6 20.4 21.7 22.0
Resource-based manufactured goods  11.4 12.0 9.9 9.1 9.3 9.4
Raw materials 20.2 9.0 6.2 4.5 3.5 3.3
Other transactions 2.1 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
      
Import Structure
High-tech manufactured goods 13.4 17.4 28.0 34.0 34.2 35.7
Mid-tech manufactured goods 45.9 42.0 30.4 31.1 29.4 27.0
Raw materials 10.8 10.3 13.7 11.5 14.5 16.4
Resource-based manufactured goods  11.9 13.9 15.2 13.0 13.2 12.6
Low-tech manufactured goods 17.0 14.9 11.6 9.9 8.2 7.8
Other transactions 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.6
Source: Interactive Graphic System for International Trade Data (SIGCI), ECLAC.
using natural resources, raw materials and other 
transactions (see table 5).
The relatively similar trade structure suggests that 
intra-industry trade is taking place. In this case, high-
tech manufactured goods are increasing rapidly. Low-
tech manufactured goods, on the other hand, mainly 
are losing weight in the trade structure, both in terms 
of exports and imports.
These data however do not reveal any information 
on Chinese advantages or disadvantages. To study the 
impact on other countries, a more detailed analysis is 
needed.
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Even though we think China will benefit from other 
emerging economies in the long term, some costs could 
arise in the short term. In particular, China is competing 
with other emerging economies in developed markets. 
In the case of Latin American countries, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Mexico is a paradigmatic 
example of these short-term costs.13
Two indices of trade competition have been used 
to assess the short-term costs stemming from Chinese 
competition. The aim of these indices is to compare the 
export structure of China with that of other emerging 
economies over a particular period of time. If the export 
structure between two countries is quite similar, then 
trade competition is more likely in third markets such 
as the United States, the major destination of Latin 
American exports.
These indices were constructed using the UNCTAD 
database. The indices are modified versions of the well-
known coefficient of specialization (CS) and coefficient 
of conformity (CC).
Where ait and ajt represent the share of good 
“n” in total exports of country “i” and country “j”, 
respectively, in period “t”. In this case, one country 
will always be China and the other a selected economy. 
If two countries (ij) have exactly the same export 
structure, then both indices are equal to 1. In this case, 
the potential trade competition is high. On the other 
hand, both indices equal 0 if there is no coincidence. 
Two indices were constructed instead of one, to ensure 
that results were consistent.14 We calculate CS and 
CC, comparing competition between China and 34 
economies (including 15 Latin American countries). 
The period is 1998-2004. Obviously, CS and CC are 
calculated for each year.
To sum up, the export structure of China is 
compared with that of 34 countries. This comparison 
is carried out for seven different years (1998-2004). 
Lastly, two different indices are used for each year. 
That information is aggregated to present the results 
in the simplest way possible. The final figure, labelled 
CI, is the arithmetic average of both indices (see table 
6 and figure 1).
The results are quite interesting. Figures are 
relatively low for all Latin American economies except 
Mexico. In general terms, the results suggest that there 
is no direct trade competition between China and Latin 
America in the United States market. Unsurprisingly, 
countries that export mainly commodities face lower 
competition. This is to be expected, as China is a net 
importer of raw materials. Paraguay, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia and Panama are those 
that exhibit the lowest figures among the 34 selected 
economies, i.e. those are the countries that suffer 
the least from Chinese trade competition. Brazil and 
Colombia could be considered intermediate cases 
between Mexico and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela.
When we compare Latin America with other 
emerging countries, and particularly those located in 
Asia, we observe that Chinese competition is not a 
problem in general terms. Thus, we might conclude 
that there are only a few, if any, short-term trade costs 
for Latin America from the trade point of view. In 
fact, most Latin American countries are witnessing 
a tremendous increase in their exports to China. In 
recent years, China has, for example, become Brazil’s 
fastest-growing export market, purchasing 80% more 
from Brazil in 2003 than in 2002. Bilateral trade more 
than quadrupled in the period 2001-2004. However 
this trade is very concentrated on five commodities: 
soybeans, iron ore, steel, soy oil and wood accounted 
for 75% of Brazil’s exports to China in 2005. Some 
big Brazilian companies like Aracruz, Latin America’s 
IV
The short-term costs: 
Chinese trade competition
13 See, for example, America Economia (2003) and The Wall Street 
Journal (2004).
14 The correlation between both indices is 0.94. This figure shows 
that both indices report the same information.
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largest wood-pulp producer, has more than doubled 
its sales to China in the past two years (they now 
account for 12% of the company’s exports).15 China 
has also become a major trading partner for other 
companies such as iron-ore producer Companhia Vale 
do Rio Doce (CVRD). Another issue for Brazil is the 
buoyancy of Chinese exports. China will continue to 
expand its exports over the next decades, with new 
products gaining market share in third markets. From 
this perspective, as underlined by Brazilian economists 
(Paiva de Abreu, 2005), some Brazilian sectors like 
iron and steel products might be affected by Chinese 
TABLE 6 
Chinese trade competition with Latin America 
in the United States market, 2000-2004a
 Coefficient of specialization Coefficient of conformity Average Average
 (CS)b (CC)b (CI)b (CI 2002)c
Paraguay 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.07
Venezuela (Bol. Rep.) 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.10
Bolivia 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.11
Panama 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.11
Chile 0.14 0.04 0.09 0.11
Honduras 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.13
Russia 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.12
Uruguay 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.17
Peru 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.17
Argentina 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.17
Guatemala 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.16
Colombia 0.25 0.12 0.18 0.20
El Salvador 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.25
Brazil 0.30 0.21 0.26 0.28
Pakistan 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.32
Slovakia 0.40 0.23 0.31 0.33
Spain 0.42 0.22 0.32 0.34
Costa Rica 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.29
India 0.42 0.25 0.34 0.38
Japan 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.38
Philippines 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.33
Bulgaria 0.43 0.36 0.39 0.41
Croatia 0.45 0.34 0.40 0.42
Poland 0.44 0.35 0.40 0.46
Turkey 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.49
Indonesia 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.42
United States 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44
Romania 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.52
Singapore 0.45 0.52 0.48 0.43
Czech R. 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.43
Malaysia 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.46
Mexico 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.50
Republic of Korea 0.50 0.60 0.55 0.48
Hungary 0.54 0.66 0.60 0.55
Thailand 0.57 0.71 0.64 0.57
Source: Authors’ own data.
a Ascending Order of average CI
b Average 2002-2004
c Average 2000-2002
15 In May 2004, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva took 
more than 400 executives to China, the largest official Brazilian 
delegation to make a trade visit.
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FIGURE 1
Chinese trade competition with Latin America in the United States, 2000-2004
A) With Latin America
Source: Authors’ own data.
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competition in the medium term. In a more long-term 
perspective, the automobile industry could also become 
an issue.
Mexico is, clearly, another story. The results hint 
at Mexico facing strong commercial competition.16 In 
fact, only the Republic of Korea, Hungary and Thailand 
suffer from tougher potential competition. In this case, 
empirical evidence backs formal analysis. What is 
more, Chinese trade competition is tending to increase 
over time, as indicated by our CI index.17
In the second period, Chinese competition 
increased in countries where trade competition was 
already high, such as Thailand, Hungary, Republic of 
Korea and Mexico. In contrast, Latin America as a 
whole suffered less from Chinese trade competition: 
the index dropped in 11 out of the 15 Latin America 
countries studied (see figure 2).
Our analysis suggests that China could jeopardize 
some Mexican exports in foreign markets. Again, some 
empirical evidence supports this point. The largest 
market for Mexican exports is, by far, the United 
States. Thus, the United States market absorbed 85% 
of Mexican exports in 2005. In 2003, and according to 
the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
the market share of China was 12.1%, beating Mexico 
for the first time in its history. Berges (2004) studies 
these trends in detail.
Mexico specializes in information technology 
(IT) and consumer electronics, electronic components, 
clothing, transport equipment and miscellaneous 
manufacturing, according to the Balassa index.18 This 
index measures the revealed comparative advantage 
according to the Balassa formula. The index, which 
includes 14 different sectors, compares the share of a 
given sector in national exports with the share of this 
sector in world exports. If this index is above one, then 
FIGURE 2
Chinese trade competition, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004
 Large increase Small increase Small decrease Large decrease
Source: Authors’ own data.
16 Soler (2003) reaches the same conclusion: China jeopardizes 
Mexican exports. However, the final impact on Mexico depends not 
only on trade competition, but also on changes in capital flows.
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the country is specialized in that sector. China, in contrast, 
is specialized in IT and consumer electronics, electronic 
components, clothing, miscellaneous manufacturing, 
textiles, basic manufactures and leather goods. China and 
Mexico therefore specialize in similar sectors. From the 
Mexican point of view, transport equipment is the only 
sector in which Chinese competition is not relevant.
Some economists argue that the Mexican export 
model could be at risk. In 1994, the North American 
Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force. 
Mexico specialized in manufactures of low value added, 
i.e. maquila products. China can also produce this kind 
of goods, but at a lower cost. Labour is relatively more 
abundant in China than in Latin America. As mentioned 
before, wages are four times lower in China than in 
Latin American countries (on average). In addition the 
Chinese authorities foster these sorts of labour-intensive 
industries through their “one-stop shop” programme. 
This programme grants tax exemptions and technical 
assistance. Joining WTO gave China access to the 
United States market. The current export structure 
of Mexico will probably change because of Chinese 
competition. Singapore, Taiwan Province of China 
and the Republic of Korea are already changing their 
export structure by upgrading the value added of their 
exports. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to foresee the direction 
of change in the case of Mexico and to assess the future 
impact of China if we take into account dimensions 
other than production and labour costs. Mexico clearly 
has a competitive advantage over China: proximity 
to the United States. Economists have been stressing 
the related issues of transport costs and trade costs in 
order to capture the penalty of distance (see Hummels, 
2001a). Distance also introduces delays that give rise 
to trade, freight and transaction costs. However, as 
argued by Harrigan and Venables (2004), and Hummels 
(2001b), an important element of the cost of distance 
in trade issues is also time, that is the time taken in 
delivering final and intermediate goods. Time costs are 
not only a quantitatively important aspect of proximity 
but quality also matters in terms of synchronization of 
activities, delivery, thus creating incentives for clustering 
activities. One aspect for Mexico to consider would be 
the identification of sectors and products where this 
issue of distance and time are key comparative and 
competitive assets. 
In a detailed study, Evans and Harrigan (2003) 
developed a theoretical model where timely delivery 
matters a great deal, and products are therefore 
developed near the source of final demand, making 
wages higher as a result. In their model, timely delivery 
is a key asset because it allows retailers to respond 
quickly and efficiently to fluctuating final demand 
without holding costly inventories, and timely delivery 
is only possible where location is near final demand. 
This theoretical model is consistent with empirical 
examples and trends during the 1990s, which witnessed 
some shifts in the location of production away from 
lower-wage based producers like China toward higher-
wage locations like Mexico. This shift occurred for 
example in the sourcing of United States apparel and 
TABLE 7
Balassa Specialization Index
 China 2002 China 2004 Mexico 2002 Mexico 2004
Wood products 0.45 0.43 0.26 0.26
Leather products 3.70 3.34 0.34 -
Chemicals 0.46 0.42 0.35 0.34
Processed food 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.56
Textiles 2.43 2.39 0.53 0.49
Minerals 0.29 0.28 0.83 1.06
Basic manufactures 1.01 0.96 0.76 0.69
Non-electronic machinery 0.52 0.52 0.82 0.84
Fresh food 0.77 0.68 0.69 0.80
Miscellaneous manufacturing 1.59 1.48 1.08 1.07
Transport equipment 0.25 0.27 1.43 1.34
Clothing 3.65 3.46 1.39 1.29
Electronic components 1.04 1.04 1.49 1.53
IT and consumer electronics 2.00 2.43 1.81 1.75
Source: Authors’ own data based on Intracen, 2004, UNCTAD/WTO.
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it is concentrated precisely on goods where timeliness 
is essential. Based on detailed empirical data from a 
major department store, they found strong evidence 
that nearby producers are specialized in goods where 
time and timeliness matters, as predicted by their 
theoretical model.
One can argue that, for Mexico, working on 
reducing trade costs could bring back a strategic 
advantage for this member country of the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), as trade costs 
have become much more significant than production 
costs (Deardoff, 2004). Some studies find a modest 
decrease in the elasticity of trade to distance, though 
most of them point to little or no change, and more 
surprisingly to a modest increase (Disdier and Head, 
2004), while gravity equation estimates from panel 
data over long time periods tend to find an increase 
(Brun, Carrère and others, 2005). According to the 
estimates of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) trade 
costs are on average nearly twice as high as production 
costs. This implies that trade costs are significant 
determinants of comparative advantage, perhaps even 
more so than production costs-where China has a 
competitive advantage.
In fact, and contrary to conventional wisdom, 
the effect of distance on trade has not decreased but 
rather increased over the past decades.19 Hummels 
(2001b) provided evidence, using detailed data on 
shipping costs, that ocean freight rates have in fact 
increased while United States air cargo rates showed 
large cost reductions between 1955 and 1997 (a result 
confirmed also for overland transport costs by Glaeser 
and Kohlhase, 2003). The reduction of transport costs 
does not therefore seem to be uniform over time. 
In fact, as shown by Berthelon and Freund (2003) 
there has been a significant and increasing impact 
of distance on trade in more than 25% of the nearly 
770 industries studied, i.e. in more than 30% of trade, 
and there are almost no industries for which distance 
has become less important. Carrère and Schiff (2003) 
reached a similar conclusion by examining patterns in 
how distance affects countries’ trade over time. They 
found that the distance of trade (DOT), an indicator of 
a country’s proximity to the world centre of economic 
activity, declined over time for a majority of countries 
(with the exception of the United States) during the 
period 1962-2000. In other words, countries (still) 
benefit from proximity to the centre of world activity 
while others are penalized for being far from it. In 
a systematic survey of empirical research on how 
distance effects have fallen or increased over time (856 
distance effects examined in 55 papers), Disdier and 
Head (2004) found that the negative impact of distance 
on trade has not decreased but rather has increased 
over the last century.
Another issue for Mexico, and also other Latin 
American countries, will be to reduce transport costs 
and boost infrastructure efficiency. For most Latin 
American countries, transport costs are even greater 
barriers to United States markets than import tariffs.20 
In a detailed analysis of shipping costs to the United 
States market, using a database of more than 300,000 
observations per year on shipment products, Clark, 
Dollar and Micco (2004) found that port efficiency is 
an important determinant of shipping costs.21 This is a 
relevant issue as the lowering of average tariff barriers 
(both in Asia and in Latin America) has increased the 
relative importance of transport costs as a determinant 
of trade. When Mexico is excluded, Latin American 
average freight costs are similar or even in some cases 
higher than those of the Asian competitor. 
For some countries, like Chile or Ecuador, 
transport costs are more than 20 times higher than the 
average tariffs they face in the United States. Lowering 
transport costs, and therefore increasing infrastructure 
efficiency, could boost the trade performance of Latin 
American exporters.22 Focusing on the effects of port 
efficiency on transport costs, Clark, Dollar and Micco 
(2004) found that improving port efficiency from the 
25th to 75th percentiles will reduce shipping costs by 
more than 12%. In the case of Mexico, which benefits 
from proximity to the United States, an improvement 
in port efficiency to the levels observed in countries 
like France or Sweden would reduce transport costs 
by around 10%. In the case of Brazil or Ecuador, it 
would reduce their maritime transport costs by more 
19 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
20 In this sense, the Panamá-Puebla highway —a new infrastructure 
project— could generate a significant increase in trade between 
Central American countries and Mexico and the United States.
21 They also show that distance matters and that it has a significantly 
(1%) positive effect on transport costs: doubling the distance 
roughly generates an 18% increase in transport costs. See table in 
Appendix B.
22 Limao and Venables (2000) showed that raising transport costs by 
10% reduces trade volumes by more than 20%. They also underlined 
that poor infrastructure accounts for more than 40% of predicted 
transport costs.
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than 15%, according to the estimates of the authors. 
Latin America is perceived as being one of the least 
eff icient regions in terms of ports, and also has 
significant customs problems with a median clearing 
delay of 7 days (the worst performers being Ecuador 
(15 days) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(11 days)); moreover, ports face high container 
handling costs and major organized criminal activity 
in seaport infrastructure. Clearly, there is ample room 
for improvement. All in all, an improvement in port 
efficiency from 25th to 75th percentiles would reduce 
shipping costs by more than 12%, which would be 
equivalent to 5,000 miles in distance, according to the 




As shown, China’s impact on Latin America is 
generally positive with a few exceptions. Yet even for 
the countries like Mexico that are facing increasing 
competition pressure in the United States market, 
China could be (at least in theory) an opportunity and 
a potential export market for intra-trade exchanges.
Two indices were constructed in order to assess the 
potential benefits of increasing Chinese demand. As in 
the previous case, the UNCTAD database containing 620 
different goods has been used. These indices compare 
the export structure of 15 Latin American countries 
with the import structure of China. If the exports of a 
particular country are similar to the imports of China, 
then there is a potential trade gain for Latin American 
economies. It is important to point out that the Latin 
American country and China do not necessarily trade, 
even if the value of these indices is close to one. We 
must highlight that there is a potential gain and an 
obvious commercial opportunity. 
The indices are, again, modified versions of the 
well-known specialization coefficient (CSm) and the 
conformity coefficient (CCm). 
Where ait represents the share of good n in total 
exports of the Latin American country i in period t. 
On the other hand, ajt is the share of good n in total 
imports of China in period t. Both indices are equal to 
1 if there is a perfect correspondence between Chinese 
imports and exports of the Latin American country 
under consideration. Again, two indices were built to 
ensure consistent results. As in the previous section, 
the period considered is 1998-2004 and CSm and CCm 
are calculated for every year. Finally, for presentation 
purposes the previous information is aggregated into 
a new index (CIm) (see table 8).
TABLE 8
Potential trade with China
 CSmab CCmab CImb CIm
    2002c
Panama 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.08
Honduras 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.08
Paraguay 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10
Peru 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.15
Bolivia 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.14
Uruguay 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.15
Chile 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.17
El Salvador 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.17
Guatemala 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.16
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.17 0.30 0.23 0.25
Costa Rica 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
Colombia 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.27
Argentina 0.31 0.23 0.27 0.30
Brazil 0.40 0.33 0.36 0.36
Mexico 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.47
Source: Authors’ own data.
a Ascending Order CIm
b Average 2002-2004.
c Average 2000-2002.
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The results are not very encouraging. The main 
reason is that Latin American countries are exporters 
of commodities and therefore the potential trade with 
China is concentrated on a small basket of goods. In 
other words, intra-industry trade is not very likely 
with Latin America given its export structure (with the 
exception of Mexico and Brazil). 
The export specialization index is only presented 
for larger countries in the interests of simplicity. In table 
A.2 (appendix A), which presents data for 11 Latin 
American countries, the figures in bold type represent 
those sectors in which Latin America is specialized 
and China is not, i.e. wood products, processed food, 
minerals and perishable goods. Those sectors are 
clearly raw materials. El Salvador and Guatemala 
also specialize in chemicals23 and Mexico in transport 
equipment.
In general terms, Latin America specializes in 
exporting commodities. This means that potential trade 
gains are limited to few items. Furthermore, trade with 
China could entail a deeper specialization in those 
goods, because of current strong Chinese demand for 
commodities, thereby increasing the risk that some 
countries might be caught in a “raw material corner” 
without being able to move ahead in the value added 
chain. In fact, China is also increasing its demand in 
some raw material markets (see table 9). In 2003, China 
became the world’s largest importer of cotton, copper, 
soybean and the fourth largest importer of oil.24 China’s 
demand for raw materials keeps growing, particularly 
for copper and soybean (demand rising by 50% yearly). 
In the case of oil, the rate of growth is nearly 20% 
every year. In 2003, China became the world’s leading 
importer of copper, boosting exports from Chile and 
Peru. The combination of a heavy industrial expansion 
and a booming economy also created a huge demand 
for oil that suppliers are straining to keep up with, 
causing the country to leapfrog Japan to become the 
second-largest oil consumer just behind the United 
States. In 2003, China alone was responsible for a third 
of the rise in daily global oil consumption.
TABLE 9
China and the world: Average annual 






Source: Based on the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), World Metal Statistics and British Petroleum.
a Average 2001-2004.
Even though trade is concentrated in a small 
basket of commodities, China’s strong demand for 
raw materials is good news for Latin America. In 
economic terms, this could be considered as a positive 
demand shock. Furthermore, there is a positive impact 
on the region, even if direct trade with China does 
not rise. The reason is that commodities are almost 
homogenous goods. For example, if China increases 
its demand for crude, oil-producer countries should 
raise their production; otherwise prices will increase. 
Since 2004, China’s growing thirst for oil has been 
driving oil prices to their highest levels since trading 
in oil futures began on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange in 1983. According to the Paris-based OECD 
International Energy Agency, China accounted for 
one million barrels of the 1.8 million barrel increase 
in daily oil use during the first quarter of 2004. From 
2000 to 2004, China accounted for nearly 40% of the 
entire growth in world oil demand.
The four main commodities in Latin America are 
copper, oil, soybean and coffee. These commodities 
account for 66% of total exports of raw materials. 
China absorbs a significant share of these commodities, 
excluding coffee.
Another relevant fact is that Latin America is 
a major world producer of commodities. The region 
produces 47% of the world soybean crop, 40% of 
copper production and 9.3% of that of crude oil. 
Strong Chinese demand represents an opportunity 
for most Latin American countries in the short-term, 
because of their export specialization in commodities. 
If this vigorous demand continues over time, there is 
likely to be positive impact on the region. However, 
unless the region increases its level of specialization, 
its dependence on commodities will intensify and 
countries will remain exposed to trade shocks.
23 However, China imports chemical products mainly from East 
Asian countries. This sector is one in which those Asian economies 
are specialized. See Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2003).
24 Using 2004 data, China accounted for 34.3% of world imports of 
soybeans, compared with only 7.4% in 1997. In the case of copper, 
China’s imports were 25.3% in 2004, compared with 5.0% in 1997. 
Lastly, Chinese imports of oil added up to 7.2% in 2004, compared 
with 2.3% in 1997.
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The above-mentioned negative interpretation regarding 
China’s impact is that this demand shock is a transitory 
one. In the long term, as predicted by economic theory, 
the positive performance of the Chinese economy 
and the increase in world trade would be beneficial 
to other countries. In this sense, the World Economic 
Outlook (IMF, 2004), presents two alternative scenarios 
analysing Chinese impact on world trade and growth. 
The results should, however, be treated with caution as 
both scenarios show a positive impact on the rest of 
the world in the long term. Most regions will benefit 
from stronger demand generated by China’s rapid 
growth, although regions where labour faces relatively 
stronger competition from China benefit less. In 
addition, this study emphasizes that more structurally 
flexible countries will reap greater benefits. These 
results are similar to the findings of Ianchovichina 
and Martin (2003).
This state of affairs, characterized by the emergence 
of a global trade player, is however not new.25 To 
illustrate this point we could compare the current 
situation with the Japanese experience of the 1950s and 
1960s (see Yang, 2003; HSBC, 2005). At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, Japan was a key economy. It 
represented around 9% of world gross domestic product 
(GDP). Following the Second World War, however, 
the country was devastated. At that time, Japan was 
characterized by its relatively low wages. For more than 
20 years, Japan implemented an economic policy that 
boosted growth and exports. That policy turned Japan 
into the second-largest economy. Nowadays, it is clear 
that the positive performance of the Japanese economy 
was partly due to the state of the world economy as a 
whole (including Latin America).
In some ways, the performance of the Chinese 
economy is similar to the Japanese experience. There 
is a clear correspondence between the two countries. 
The evidence matches up with the period of higher 
growth in Japan: 1952-1972; the period considered 
for China is 1979-1999. In each case, the growth rate 
was an average of 8.5%. In addition, average annual 
growth in trade 26 was around 13%.27
However, similar trade and growth patterns are 
not the only similarities. The weight of each country 
in the world economy during the relevant period is also 
similar. Consequently, both countries have contributed 
TABLE 10
Latin America (seven countries): Composition of exports 
(Percentages of exports of each country)
 Food Fuels Metals Manufactures
Mexico 6 10 2 81
Brazil 31 1 9 54
Argentina 49 12 2 34
Colombia 32 31 1 31
Peru 35 7 39 17
Chile 25 1 48 16
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 2 83 2 12
Source: Based on LatinFocus (2004).
VI
China’s impact on trade in the long term
25 See, for instance, World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2004). This 
edition also analyses the emergence of East Asia.
26 In this paper we define trade as the sum of exports and imports.
27 We have used the Summers and Heston database (PWT 6.1). See 
Heston and Summers (1997).
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to world growth, on average, approximately 0.6 
percentage points every year. In other words, during 
the period 1952-1972, world GDP grew by an average 
of 5.8%, with 0.6 percentage points of that growth 
attributable to Japanese GDP performance. During the 
period 1979-1999, average annual world growth was 
3.7%, with Chinese growth contributing 0.6 points 
(see figure 3).
However, this comparison also throws up some 
striking differences. The composition of Japan’s GDP 
in the early 1950s was quite similar to that of China in 
the early 1980s (see table 11). Around 60% of GDP was 
consumption, 15% was investment and over 25% was 
net exports.28 Throughout the periods mentioned, the 
composition of GDP changed significantly. In the case 
of Japan, one can observe a reduction in consumption 
and net exports as a proportion of GDP, which was 
offset by investment. But in the case of China, there 
was a decrease in consumption and it was replaced by 
an increase in net exports and investment.
These figures reveal why China is perceived as 
a rival instead of a trading partner. The data show 
that China exports much more than it imports. So, 
other countries perceive that Chinese growth is not 
spreading. But this situation is not sustainable in the 
long-term. Eventually, China will import massively 
and net exports will fall.29 In fact, according to the 
WTO database, in 2005 Chinese merchandise imports 
totalled 6.1% of world imports. On the other hand, 
Chinese exports amounted to 7.3% of world exports. 
The difference between merchandise exports and 
imports represents US$ 101.9 billion. This amount is 
three times the nominal GDP of Ecuador. Now in the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
FIGURE 3
Japan and China: share of world GDP
(Percentage of world GDP)
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TABLE 11
Japan and China: Components of GDP 








Net Exports 27 32
Source: Summer and Heston database.
28 Net exports are defined as the difference between exports and 
imports in real terms. 
29 Ianchovichina and Martin (2001) share this opinion about the 
future of net exports. They expect a significant increase in China’s 
imports.
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Chinese manufacturers are already lapping up imports 
and dictating global prices for nearly everything from 
copper to microchips.
Another important difference between the two 
countries is that Japan had a more developed economy 
and China is still a developing country (see figure 4). 
Chinese per capita GDP in 2000 was around 50% below 
the world average. According to the Summers and 
Heston database,30 per capita GDP in China is similar 
to that of Ecuador. This evidence suggests that, despite 
its impressive performance over the last 20 years, a 
deeper convergence process might take some time. 
In other words, China could still enjoy a high rate of 
growth for a long period.
In this regard, some simple projections have been 
made to evaluate the future weight of China within the 
world economy (see table 12).31 In the 1990s, China 
grew by 10.1% on average, the world by 3.3% and 
Latin America by 3.4%. If these rates hold for the next 
20 years, China will become the largest economy, far 
outstripping the United States.32
In 2002, Chinese merchandise imports already 
represented 4.4% of world imports. During the 1990s, 
Chinese imports grew by around 16% on average and 
world imports (excluding China) by around 7%. If 
these trends continue, China will represent 8% of world 
imports in the year 2010 and 18% in the year 2020.
It is hard to foresee, in detail, the long-term 
impact of China’s emergence on other economies and 
on international trade. Nevertheless, we know that the 
aggregate impact has to be positive. It is also true, 
however, that the impact could be asymmetrical. Some 
sectors could benefit and others might be harmed 
by Chinese competition. China has a competitive 
advantage in labour-intensive sectors in particular, and 
the potential benefits for those sectors are therefore 
lower. The opposite is true of capital-intensive 
sectors.33
FIGURE 4
Japan and China, per capita GDP 
GDP per capita / World GDP per capita ratio
Source: based on Summer and Heston database.
TABLE 12
China and Latin America: share 
of world GDP, 2002 -2020 
(Percentages)
 2002 2010 2020
China 12.7 21.1 40.1
Latin America 7.9 7.9 8.0
Source: Authors’ own data.
30 Per capita GDP is calculated in terms of PPP.
31 Using the IMF database.
32 For more information on China growth forecasts, see Wilson and 
Purushothaman, 2003; Gaulier, Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2005; 
Goldman Sachs, 2005.
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Generally speaking, the impact of Chinese trade on 
Latin America is positive in the short and medium term. 
The results of our study are consistent with the findings 
of IMF researchers and other economists (Lall and 
Weiss, 2004). On average, and from the point of view of 
trade impact, Latin America will benefit from increased 
Chinese demand and growth. In comparative terms, as 
stressed by IMF, the only net loser will be South Asia, 
while for Latin America the effect will be positive. For 
sectors like agriculture in Latin America, the estimated 
impact of faster Chinese integration around 2020 is 
clearly positive (with output up by 4%). The clear losers 
will, however, be sectors such as textiles and countries 
specialized in labour-intensive manufacturing exports. 
More detailed analysis is needed, particularly in terms 
of the trade impact of China on the domestic markets 
of Latin American countries such as Mexico. 
In terms of trade relations, China and Latin 
America have been intensively developing their 
relations over the past decade.34 The trade volume 
between China and Latin America rose from US$ 2 
billion in the early 1990s to US$ 15 billion in 2001, 
according to Chinese statistics. Since 2000, Brazilian 
and Chinese trade has leapt nearly threefold, a blessing 
for the indebted Brazilian economy and especially for 
exporters of soybean, steel and iron ore, which account 
for two thirds of the goods exported. In general, Latin 
America, has a surplus commodity endowment that 
coincides with China’s needs and its strategy to secure 
food and energy imports in order to avoid shortages.
One of the consequences of booming Chinese 
demand for Latin America might not be as positive, 
however. First, with China’s increasing demand for 
commodities, Latin American countries are deepening 
their trade specialization toward commodities - goods 
usually characterized by strong price volatility. In 
fiscal terms, this also could increase volatility of fiscal 
receipts. Second, with the intensification of links with 
China, the region is becoming more exposed to that 
country’s economy. In 2003, delivery bottlenecks and 
demand from China bumped up the prices of raw 
materials and commodities, but Chinese industrial 
use is also susceptible to recessions and booms. In 
recent years, tensions have arisen between Brazil and 
China because of the latter’s increasing price-setting 
power in key Brazilian markets such as iron ore and 
soybean. The growing dependence of Latin American 
exports on China should also force the region to be 
more aware of growth dynamics in Asia and China. In 
2003, China became the second-largest destination of 
Brazilian exports around the world according to ECLAC, 
a position that has since been maintained.35 In 2004, 
China accounted for half the increase in Brazil’s exports 
earnings. China is therefore becoming a key driver of 
Brazilian growth dynamics and is responsible for a 
quarter of Brazil’s official targeted GDP growth. With 
China trying to cool down its overheated economy, 
Brazil’s export growth could be dampened. 
Another issue not developed in this paper that 
deserves further analyses is that of capital flows. While 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Latin America is 
tumbling, China is experiencing a boom. Between 2001 
and 2003, FDI into Mexico declined from nearly US$ 27 
billion to US$ 11 billion, with an upturn in 2004 and 
2005. Brazil also experienced an abrupt slowdown with 
a 52% drop in FDI to the country in 2003 in relation to 
the previous year (compared with 30% for Mexico over 
the same period). Meanwhile, China has simply become 
the major recipient of FDI in the world, reaching levels 
of US$ 55 billion in 2003 (nearly twice the total that 
flowed into all Latin American countries in 2003 —a 
mere US$ 36.5 billion)36 and again around 60 billion 
both in 2004 and 2005. In other words, over the past 
VII
Chinese and Latin America 
trade relations in a wider context
34 Trade contacts between China and Latin America are nothing 
new. They date back to the 1570s, when Sino-Latin American trade 
started to flourish across the Pacific with Chinese exports of silk, 
porcelain and cotton yarn to Mexico and Peru via Manila (see 
Shixue, 2004).
35 See ECLAC, 2004a.
36 See ECLAC (2004b). In 2003, FDI flows to China almost reached 
the record level of FDI inflows to Latin America (US$ 88 billion 
in 1999). 
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three years, every week, more than 1 billion dollars of 
foreign direct investment is flowing into China.37 
It is true that much of the FDI to China is in fact 
related to “round tripping” (Xiao, 2005). Experts have 
estimated that the scale of this round tripping could be 
as high as a quarter of total FDI inflows into China. 
However, the FDI from other regions is increasing. In 
2002, United States firms were already investing 10 
more times in China than ten years previously. The 
prospect of a huge domestic market of 1.3 billion 
consumers has lured countless companies to rush into 
China, despite the fact that the country’s capitalism is 
not solidly rooted in law, protection of property rights 
and free markets.38 
Some studies are pointing to “flow diversion” 
in favour of China, following the full integration of 
the country’s huge labour force into the international 
division of labour.39 In the case of Asian countries like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, this 
process might cause significant losses if foreign direct 
investment is redirected away from these countries 
to China. There is a risk of them experiencing a de-
industrialization process and a return to the roles they 
had in the 1950s and 1960s as primary commodity 
exporters (McKibbin and Thye Woo, 2003). However 
both the studies and the data show that the impact is 
rather small. From studying the period 1984 to 2001, 
Garcia-Herrero and others concluded that, in terms of 
FDI, there is no substitution effect negatively affecting 
inflows of FDI to Latin America. The study does, 
however, underline the fact that the Chinese effect has 
become more significant in recent years (1995-2001), 
with inflows of FDI to China appearing to have affected 
FDI received by Mexico and Colombia in particular. 
The data for 2004 and 2005 are also mixed. They 
suggest that, while China is still experiencing a boom 
of FDI, reaching levels of more than US$ 60 billion, 
Latin American countries are recovering from the 
extremely low levels of this current decade. Foreign 
direct investment towards Brazil jumped by 80% in 
2004, reaching more than US$ 18 billion. Mexico also 
experienced a recovery of 23%, reaching US$ 13.6 
billion while Chile saw its FDI increase by 66%, to 
stand at almost US$ 5 billion. The 1990s golden years 
of the FDI rush towards Latin American might be over, 
at least unless privatization processes are repeated. 
However, a “blessing in disguise” of Chinese 
investment in term of capital flows could be the future 
development of Chinese foreign investment overseas. 
China is no longer only an absorber of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), but has also made a leap forward in 
its investments overseas. Over the period 1991-2003, 
Chinese foreign direct investment reached roughly 
US$ 35 billion. In 2003, China’s outward investment 
more than doubled year-on-year to stand at over US$ 
2 billion (still a low level, however). This trend was 
maintained in the years that followed. In 2004, 50% of 
Chinese FDI went towards Latin America (more than 
the 30% than went towards Asia). In 2005, Chinese 
multinationals invested a record level of just under 
US$ 7 billion abroad. The bulk went to Asia (60%) 
but Latin America remained on the radar screens as 
the second major recipient region of Chinese FDI (16% 
of the total).
The need to secure food and commodities is 
boosting FDI through strategic international partnerships. 
Chinese firms have been targeting resource-sector 
investments in Angola, Algeria, Australia and Indonesia. 
Chinese companies are already prominent investors in 
Africa, mainly in energy and raw materials. According 
to a survey of 100 investment promotion agencies 
released by UNCTAD, China ranked fifth (after the 
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France) in the list of leading overseas investors in the 
near future.40 In 2004, Chinese corporations multiplied 
37 On FDI in China, see the research of MIT-based economist Huang 
(2003). See also the relevant United States Congressional hearings: 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/092403/huang.php
38 Investing in China might, however, become a risky business, 
as underlined by the growing disputes between foreigners and 
their Chinese partners. In 2004, for example, Syngenta, a Swiss 
agrichemicals company sued a Chinese competitor for allegedly 
pirating one of its patented insecticides, joining the growing club of 
foreign investors resorting to the courts to protect their intellectual 
property. The profitability of Chinese investments can also be 
questionable. Foreign brewers have squandered hundreds of millions 
of dollars in China over the past decade. Meanwhile, according to The 
Economist (2005), the average net profit margin of these investments 
is meagre: for the top 400 brewers operating in China (including 
foreign joint ventures) the margin is a mere 0.5%. Compared with 
Latin America, the data are interesting. According to a study carried 
out by the China Economic Quarterly, direct and indirect profits made 
by all United States affiliates operating in China amounted to just 
US$ 2.8 billion in 2001, nearly half the US$ 4.4 billion they made in 
Mexico in the same year (and with a population more than 10 times 
smaller). According to another empirical study on political control and 
firm performance in China’s listed companies, the decision-making 
power of local party committees (relative to the largest shareholders) 
is positively associated with firm performance (See Chang and Wong 
(2003); see also Wong, Opper and Hu (2004)).
39 For an empirical analysis applied to Latin America, see Garcia-
Herrero and Santabárbara (2004); Chantasasawat, Fung and others 
(2004); for other analyses focused on Asia see Eichengreen and Tong 
(2005a and 2005b); and Mercereau (2005). 40 See UNCTAD, 2004.
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attempts to boost their investments overseas, not only 
in other emerging countries but also in developed 
countries —as underlined by the acquisition of IBM 
production units by Lenovo (for US$ 1.75 billion) or 
the attempts by Chinese firms such as Minmetals to 
acquire the Canadian Noranda for US$ 5 billion or 
efforts by the Chinese oil group China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to acquire Unocal for 
more than US$ 13 billion. 
Like Japanese companies a few decades ago, 
Chinese firms seem to be seeking overseas expansion. 
For Latin America this looks like an opportunity. Not 
only are major Asian countries (Japan and China) 
interested in the region, but both have the same 
aim: to secure the continued flow of raw materials 
and agricultural products and derivatives. In order 
to reach that goal, they are both interested in having 
viable infrastructure in the Americas (more efficient 
ports, airports, roads, railways). For the region, this 
is therefore a unique opportunity to play a new 
competitive game. It also provides the opportunity to 
implement an industrial strategy in order to avoid an 
intensification of the commodity trade specialization 
and stimulate diversification (like in Trinidad and 
Tobago) towards more value-added industries, while 
building on the commodity endowment.
Latin America is on the radar of Chinese 
companies. By 2001, China had set up more than 
300 enterprises in Latin America with contractual 
investments of over US$ 1 billion. Since then Baosteel, 
China’s biggest steelmaker, undertook the country’s 
largest ever overseas foreign direct investment (worth 
US$ 1.5) in Brazil. Plans to invest US$ 2 billion in 
the Brazilian aluminium industry were also announced 
by China, but have yet to be confirmed. China already 
controls, through the Shougang Group, Peru’s major 
iron-ore mine, owns a major stake in an Ecuadorian oil 
field and is attempting to produce fuel in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, where it has also reactivated 
gold mines. Chinese investment is expected in railways 
and ports in Brazil, and throughout Latin America. 
Chinese interest in logistical infrastructure is high, 
with a view to facilitating transport of commodities 
to ports. In Argentina, China is already committed 
to invest US$ 25 million in a grain port and another 
US$ 250 million in a road from Argentina to Chile in 
order to facilitate exports of Argentine raw materials 
from Chilean ports.
We will also begin to witness agreements such as 
the one signed in October 2004 by Telefónica (a leading 
Spanish firm with a regional Latin American franchise) 
and the Chinese telecommunication equipment 
manufacturer Huawei, whereby Telefónica offers 
Huawei facilities to enter the Latin American market 
and sell its products to all of Telefónica’s Latin 
American subsidiaries.41 In 2006, BBVA, the leading 
Spanish bank, boosted its presence in China by opening 
offices in Shanghai and Beijing and boosting its Hong 
Kong base. It also concluded an agreement with the 
Bank of China in order to capture Chinese remittance 
flows coming from the United States but also from 
some Latin American countries like Peru.
Latin American companies are also looking for 
business opportunities in China, as demonstrated by the 
official trip that Brazilian President Lula and nearly 400 
Brazilian businessmen made to China in 2004. Some 
large Latin American companies have already rushed 
into China, such as EMBRAER, the Brazilian Aircraft 
Corporation, which sells and produces jets in China42 
or Marcopolo, another Brazilian company that makes 
bus chassis and is planning to set up a factory in China. 
They follow in the footsteps of Embraco, a pioneering 
company that set up a plant in Beijing in 1995. Ten 
years later, it was followed by the motor producer Weg, 
which set up the first wholly Brazilian-owned factory 
in China. Steel producer Gerday also announced the 
acquisition of a Chinese mill while Belgian-Brazilian 
Inbev acquired a local beer producer. Clearly, in terms 
of trade-flow dynamics, capital flows between China 
and Latin America deserve more analysis and invite 
further research.
However, beyond the trade and investment impacts, 
there may be a third and final impact of Chinese trade: a 
cognitive effect. China’s economic development is very 
41 Huawei is a clear example of the internationalization process of 
Chinese companies. The company hopes to increase its international 
sales from US$ 2.3 billion in 2004 to more than US$ 10 billion by 
2008 as part of an ambitious global expansion strategy. In 2003, 
Huawei also invested 27% of its US$ 4 billion total investment 
outside China, reaching markets such as Sweden or Netherlands. The 
company is now present in more than 70 countries and over 3,000 of 
the group’s 24,000 employees are based overseas. In 2004, two fifths of 
its US$ 5 billion revenues were made outside China (The Economist, 
2005; Financial Times, 2005). However, as underlined by Yasheng 
Huang from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), most 
of the “Chinese champions” are in fact foreign companies. Lenovo, 
the purchaser of IBM personal computer business in 2004, is a clear 
example. Technically speaking it is a foreign company as it organized 
its operations in China as subsidiaries of its Hong Kong branch. The 
four Chinese companies listed as the most dynamic in Forbes all have 
their headquarters in Hong Kong. As stressed by Huang, it seems that 
“China’s success has less to do with creating efficient institutions and 
more about allowing such an escape from inefficient institutions” 
(Huang, 2005). See also http://web.mit.edu/yshuang/www/.
42 For a case study, see Goldstein, 2004.
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pragmatic. The unique marriage between capitalism and 
communism is attracting a growing amount of attention. 
Leading economists like Ricardo Hausmann and Dani 
Rodrik have already emphasized the trade dimension 
of this unusual emerging giant, the Chinese economic 
miracle being a matter not only of export volumes but 
also, and above all, of their higher quality: what China 
exports matters (Rodrik, 2006; Hausmann, Hwang and 
Rodrik, 2006). The very pragmatic economic approach 
of the Chinese authorities is attracting the attention of 
policy makers around the world. The Chinese miracle 
is neither the result of some “Chicago Boys” process 
nor the output of a Kemmerer mission. No foreign 
advisor or guru of economic development ever landed 
in China. If Jeffrey Sachs advised Bolivia, he never 
reached Beijing, or at least his advice never did. The 
lesson that is arising from China is also that there is 
no magic formula for development, no special key of 
a paradigm that will open the doors to the miracle of 
development.
APPENDIX A
Trade competition between China and Latin America
TABLE A.1
Latin America (fifteen countries): annual average CI,a 1998-2004b
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mexico 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.53
Costa Rica 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.33
Brazil 0.25 0.27 0.3 0.3 0.28 0.25 0.26
El Salvador 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.26
Colombia 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18
Guatemala 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17
Argentina 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14
Peru 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13
Uruguay 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.12
Chile 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.09
Honduras 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.09 …
Bolivia 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08
Panama 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.08
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06
Paraguay 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05
Source: Authors’ own data.
a  The average CI is the arithmetic mean between the coefficient of specialization and the coefficient of conformity.
b  Descending order of the column relating to 2004.
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TABLE A.2
Specialization Index (Balassa)
 China Mexico Costa Brazil El Colombia Guatemala Argentina Peru Chile Venezuela
   Rica  Salvador      (Bol. Rep. of)
Wood products 0.43 0.26 0.51 2.26 2.99 0.78 0.91 0.60 0.58 4.10 …
Leather products 3.34 … 0.60 2.88 1.40 0.93 0.66 1.98 - - …
Chemicals 0.42 0.34 0.75 0.62 1.16 0.86 1.44 0.68 0.35 0.62 0.29
Processed food 0.47 0.56 2.11 2.93 5.17 1.49 4.73 6.60 4.13 2.53 0.16
Textiles 2.39 0.49 0.23 0.60 2.23 0.71 0.77 0.20 0.68 0.17 …
Minerals 0.28 1.06 … 1.05 0.54 3.63 0.76 1.75 2.56 1.67 7.54
Basic 
manufactures 0.96 0.69 0.44 1.60 1.39 1.04 0.77 0.75 2.86 3.66 1.09
Non-electronic
machinery 0.52 0.84 0.10 0.82 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.06 0.07 0.05
Fresh food 0.68 0.80 5.67 4.13 3.00 4.14 7.18 5.50 2.52 4.54 0.11
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 1.48 1.07 1.39 0.27 0.92 0.44 0.51 0.20 0.35 0.11 0.05
Transport 
equipment 0.27 1.34 0.03 0.88 … 0.10 … 0.45 … 0.08 0.15
Clothing 3.46 1.29 1.51 0.12 1.93 1.48 1.14 … 2.81 … …
Electronic 
components 1.04 1.53 … 0.20 0.24 0.12 0.20 0.05 … … …
IT and consumer 
electronics 2.43 1.75 2.40 0.26 … … … … … … …
Source: Authors’ own data based on Intracen, 2004, UNCTAD/WTO.
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APPENDIX B
Container handling charges
Country  Cargo  Mandatory  Price  Cooperative  Median Port  Crime Container Handling Charges
 Handling Services Fixed Agreements clearance Efficiency  Index
 Restriction Index  Agreements  Index time Index (1-7) World CMPCH LSU
 Index  Index  (Days) (1-7)  Bank Indexb Indexc
        Indexa
 
Singapore 1 0.38 0 0.33 2 6.76 6.72 117 … …
Hong Kong 0 0.25 0 0 … 6.38 5.46 … … …
SAR
Taiwan 0.5 0 0 0 … 5.18 4.49 140 163 …
Japan 0.75 0.13 0.89 1 … 5.16 5.16 250 202 …
Malaysia 0 0.25 0 0.38 7 4.95 5.76 75 … …
Spain 0 0.06 1 0 4 4.88 6.08 200 105 …
Republic 0 0.38 0 0 … 4.12 5.22 … … …
of Korea
Thailand 0.5 0.63 0 0.38 4 3.98 5.12 93 … …
Argentina 0 0.13 0 1 7 3.81 4.52 … 139 …
Vietnam 0 0 0 0.5 … 3.81 5.02 … … …
Chile 0 0.25 0.43 1 3 3.76 6.05 202 100 …
China 0.5 0 0 0 7 3.49 4.44 110 … …
Indonesia 1 0.06 0 0.38 5 3.41 4.06 … … …
Mexico 0.5 0.38 0 1 4 3.34 2.61 … … …
Venezuela 0 0 1 1 11 3.28 3.63 … … …
(Bol. Rep. of)
El Salvador 0 0 0 1 4 2.95 2.3 … … 61
Brazil 0.5 0.75 0 1 10 2.92 4.45 328 292 …
Peru 0.5 0 0.5 1 7 2.88 3.32 … 142 …
India 0 0 0 1 … 2.79 4.28 … … …
Philippines 0.5 0 0 0.38 7 2.79 3.51 118 … …
Ecuador 0 0 0.43 1 15 2.63 3.65 … 139 …
Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 4 2.46 3.28 … … 68
Colombia 0.5 0.13 0.5 1 7 2.26 1.88 … … …
Bolivia … … … … 9.5 1.61 4.38 … … …
Uruguay 0 0 0 1 5 … … … … …
Source: Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004).
a US$/TEU (feet equivalent unit).
b CMPCH = Maritime Port Chamber of Chile.
c LSU index of the United States National Ports and Waterways Institute.
(Original: English)
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